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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 20060363-CA 
CAESAR RODRIGUEZ, : 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Aggravated Assault, a second-
degree felony in violation of U.C.A.§76-5-103. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO 
JUVENILE COURT? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the 
timely filing of a motion to remand case to the juvenile court, which was 
denied. (R.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since the facts of the case were not in 
dispute, the Appellate Court reviews the trial courts legal conclusions non-
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deferentially for correctness. State v. Singleton 2005 UT App 464, J^6, 128 P.3d 
28, and State v. D /^raT? 2005 UT App 409 IflO, 131 P.3d 246. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Eighth Amendment - Further Guarantees in Criminal Cases 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection Fourteenth 
Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
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oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United Stales, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the 
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Utah State Constitution 
Article I, Section 9. Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments. 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, Section 14. Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance of 
warrant. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Article I, Section 24. Uniform operation of laws. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§78-3a-603. Certification hearings—Juvenile court to hold preliminary 
hearing—Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a-
502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going 
forward with its case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best 
interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of 
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the 
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one 
or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile 
facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with 
two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to 
enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in 
Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, 
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
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(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available 
to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in 
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court. 
(5)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other 
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing the 
report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and cross-
examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the 
factors required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the 
court may enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district 
court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination 
held by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the 
juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-116, Section 78-3a-913, and other 
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the 
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent. 
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(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the 
same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that 
right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or 
when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent 
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense 
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is 
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or 
on any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1 )(b) is a third degree felony 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally brought before the juvenile court to 
answer charges of Attempted Murder, a first-degree felony; possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third-degree felony; aggravated 
assault, a second -degree felony; and riot, a third-degree felony. The case was 
heard in the juvenile court on a certification hearing on April 28, 2005, before 
the Honorable L. Kent Bachman, judge in the juvenile court. An order 
certifying the defendant to district court was filed by the juvenile court on June 
1, 2005, and the Defendant was charged by information the next day, June 2, 
2005. No appeal of that order certifying the juvenile to district court was ever 
filed. 
On November 10, 2005, the Defendant's attorney Martin Gravis filed a 
motion to remand the case back to juvenile court on the grounds that the 
defendant's rights under the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 9 and 14 of the Utah Constitution had been violated. 
Arguments were heard on that motion on January 12, 2006, before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon, and on Januaiy 20, 2005, the court issued a ruling 
denying the defendant's motion. 
On February 2, 2006, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
Aggravated Assault charge reserving the right to appeal the trial courts ruling 
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on the motion to remand pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The remaining charges were dismissed. On March 16, 2006. The 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was filed on 
April 5, 2006. The prison term was commenced that day. 
The Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on April 18, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since the facts of the case are undisputed by virtue of a guilty plea, the 
only relevant facts of the case concern the procedural issues regarding the 
certification and motion to remand. For background purposes, the brief facts of 
the crime are as follows: At the time of the offense the Defendant was 15 years 
old, and was accused of stabbing another individual in the chest during a fight. 
The Defendant was arrested for this offense, and taken to the juvenile court 
where a certification hearing was held on April 28, 2005. The juvenile court, 
on June 1, 2005, ordered that the Defendant should be certified as an adult to 
stand trial in District Court. No appeal was taken of that order. Some five 
months after the Defendant had been certified to the district court, on 
November 10, 2005, the Defendant's attorney Martin Gravis filed a motion to 
remand the case back to juvenile court on the grounds that the Defendant's 
rights under the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 
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9 and 14 of the Utah Constitution had been violated. Mr. Gravis argued that the 
recent Supreme Court decision of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
prohibited the prosecution of a juvenile in district or adult court. Arguments 
were heard on that motion on January 12, 2006, before the Honorable Michael 
D. Lyon; and on January 20, 2005, the court issued a ruling denying the 
Defendant's motion. 
On February 2, 2006, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
aggravated assault charges reserving the right to appeal the trial courts ruling 
on the motion to remand pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial 
court improperly denied the Defendant's motion to remand the case back to the 
juvenile court. Two issues arise in this determination. First, is the issue 
properly before this court since the juvenile court made the certification ruling 
on June 1, 2005, to which no appeal was taken? Since the motion to remand 
was brought in the district court and the current appeal is taken from the ruling 
on that motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on this issue. 
The second issue to be reviewed is whether the Defendant's 
constitutional rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. 
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Constitution and Article I, Sections 9 and 24 of the Utah State Constitution 
were violated by the certification of the juvenile. The case that the Defendant's 
attorney relied on in support of this position was Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005). The problem with that reliance is the fact that Roper v. Simmons 
does not stand for the proposition that the adult court system does not have 
jurisdiction over any juvenile offender. In fact, the adult court in that case 
incarcerated the defendant for a term in prison for life without the possibility of 
parole. The only issue decided by the Court in Roper v. Simmons was to 
declare the death penalty unconstitutional when applied to juveniles. 
The fact that appellant counsel may disagrees with the certification of 
this juvenile into the adult system, counsel must aclmowledge the lack of 
standing to oppose this certification, as well as concede the constitutionality of 
the general certification procedure under State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 *|20 
106 P.3d 734, and In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985). 
Furthermore, appellant counsel disagrees with Attorney Gravis that Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) stands for the proposition that adult courts do 
not have jurisdiction over certified juvenile offenders. 
Based upon all these factors, Defense counsel has been unable to find 
any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this reason, this brief is being filed in 
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accordance with the guidelines set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah 1981). 
ARGUMENT 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO 
JUVENILE COURT? 
The initial determination that must be addressed is the jurisdiction of this 
Court to even hear and decide the issues raised in the Defendant's motion to 
remand to juvenile court. In the case of Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f 
9, 89 P.3d 196, this Court stated: 
The Utah Constitution provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall have the right to ... appeal in all cases." Utah 
Const. Art. I, §12. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the 
right of appeal [is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and it 
cannot be "lightly forfeited." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 
(Utah 1985). However, appeals must be filed "within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
Utah R.App. P. 4(a). It is well established that "[i]f an appeal is 
not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." 
Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth, 2000 UT App 299^ 7, 13 P.3d 
616, cert denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Utah Supreme 
Court has warned that extraordinary writs "must not" be used to 
"make a mockery of the time limits for appeal, undermine the 
finality of criminal judgments, and promote the indefensible 
merry-go-round of collateral attack." 
See also Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) where the Court 
held: 
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Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, 
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus 
proceeding absent unusual circumstances. Fernandez v. Cook, 
783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1104. The 
unusual circumstances test requires a showing of uan obvious 
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional 
right." 
While the attack to the constitutionality of the certification proceeding in the 
case at bar was not attempted by an extraordinary writ, the same principle 
would apply to the filing of a motion to remand. The only allowable review 
under these circumstances would be if a "substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right". {Gardner v. Holden) 
In the case of State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,^ j 17 114 P.3d 585, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the late filing of a motion to withdraw a plea resulted 
in the Court losing jurisdiction to address any subsequent issues on appeal. 
The Court further refused to address a constitutional claim since it had not 
risen to the level of plain error by the trial court. See also State v. Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, \ 25 70 P.3d 111 where the Court held: "With rare exception, 
when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final judgment, including a 
default judgment, that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal." 
Even if the Defendant were able to get over the fact that the juvenile 
untimely filed the appeal by failing to attack the juvenile courts decision on 
certification rather than raising the issue in the district court by motion, the 
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case law would not support an attack to the constitutionality of this 
certification. 
Mr. Gravis argued that the recent Supreme Court decision of Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) prohibited the prosecution of a juvenile in 
district or adult court. He reasoned that if according to the Court in Roper, a 
juvenile is too immature to be categorized as a "worst offender" and if society 
had evolved to the point that it would be cruel and unusual to execute a 
juvenile, that it would naturally follow that "it is cruel and unusual punishment 
to transfer any juvenile case to the district court". (See Def. Memo page 6) 
The major flaw in this argument is that the Court in Roper v. Simmons 
affirmed the Missouri Supreme Courts decision vacating the death penalty and 
"resentencing] him to "life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, 
parole, or release except by act of the Governor." (Id at 560) 
Utah Appellate Courts have held that a juvenile has no right to be treated 
as a juvenile delinquent. Although in the case of State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 
(Utah 1995) the Court declared the direct filing of juveniles in the adult court 
pursuant to former U.C.A. §78-3a-25 unconstitutional, the language in that 
case indicates that the constitutional concern is the "undirected discretion to 
choose where to file charges", and not that a juvenile may be transferred to the 
adult court system. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 TJ20 106 P.3d 734, 
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where the Court acknowledged the jurisdiction of the district court to sentence 
a juvenile that had been transferred pursuant to a certification proceeding. 
In the case of In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985), the 
court held that a certification by the juvenile court to the district court did not 
violate due process claims as follows: 
Contrary to defendant's first contention, the statute 
explicitly provides a substantive standard for certification: the 
juvenile court must find that continued retention of jurisdiction 
would be "contrary to the best interests of the child or of the 
public." This language adequately spells out the parameters 
within which the juvenile court must exercise its discretion and 
does not deny defendant due process. 
Although that case was decided under prior law, the recodification of the 
certification procedures under §78-3a-603 are similar in nature and would be 
treated identically for purposes of this case. 
The only issue the Defendant wanted appealed was his prison sentence. 
For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests pennission to withdraw from 
further representation of the Defendant. 
Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1981). Defendant was been mailed a copy of this brief more than thirty days 
ago and has not responded to it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this 
reason, counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate 
counsel. 
DATED this £- "3ay of October 2(1)6. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney fortfih Plaintiff, L6Q-East 300 
South, 6th Floor. P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake* City,/Utah 84 J4 4-0181), gps^age 
prepaid this /#§ay of Y[MJ^M^^ot,.\ 
^NDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
16 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CAESAR RAMON RODRIGUEZ, 
Defendant. 
- ^ 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051902675 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
Date: March 16, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shannone 
Prosecutor: WILLIAM DAINES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MAPvTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 7, 1989 
Video 
Tape Number: L0316 06 Tape Count: 2:04 
CHARGES 
3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody and represented by Martin Gravis. 
Defense counsel opposes the recommendation for prison made by 
Adult Probation and Parole and requests that the defendant undergo 
a diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison. 
The defendant addresses the Court. 
The State agreed to recommend a diagnostic commitment. 
The Court informs counsel that it is not bound by the plea 
agreement. Counsel agrees. 
Defense counsel argues that the defendant is only 16 years of age 
and has been in custody of the Weber County Jail for one year. 
Based on the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's previous 
criminal record, and this being a serious crime of violence, the 
Case No: 
Date : 
051902675 
Mar 16, 2006 
Court finds that a commitment to the Utah State Prison is 
appropriate. 
The Court further finds that since the defendant was AWOL from a 
juvenile detention center at the time the crime was committed, that 
the defendant is not amenable to probation in a less-restrictive 
setting. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
The defendant shall be ordered to pay restitution as determined 
following a restitution hearing as a condition of parole. 
Dated this W day of Aft* 
MICHAE^Q. LYON 
District yCourt Judge 
